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Abstract 
We show that sovereign CDS that have common dealers tend to be more correlated, 
especially when the dealers display similar quoting activity in those contracts over time. This 
commonality in dealers’ activity is a powerful driver of CDS comovements, over and above 
fundamental similarities between countries, including default, liquidity, and macro factors. We 
posit that the mechanism causing the excess correlation is the buying pressure faced by 
CDS dealers for credit enhancements and regulatory capital reliefs. An instrumental variable 
analysis confirms that our findings are indeed rooted in a causal relationship. 
Keywords: sovereign CDS, comovements, commonalities, dealers. 
JEL Classification: G12, G14. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
En este estudio se muestra que los CDS soberanos que comparten dealers tienden a estar más 
correlacionados, especialmente cuando estos dealers presentan una actividad similar en la 
frecuencia de sus cotizaciones de dichos CDS. Este comportamiento común en la actividad de 
los dealers es uno de los principales causantes de la covariación de los precios de los CDS 
soberanos, más allá de las similitudes en los fundamentales entre países tales como riesgo de 
fallido, liquidez y factores macroeconómicos. El mecanismo que causa este exceso de 
correlación es la presión de compra a la que se enfrentan los dealers, en su mayoría bancos, 
para la mejora de la calidad crediticia de su cartera y/o del capital regulatorio. Un análisis de 
variables instrumentales confirma que la evidencia anterior tiene una relación causal. 
Palabras clave: CDS soberanos, dealers, covariación. 
Códigos JEL: G12, G14. 
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1 Introduction 
Asset returns may comove beyond what can be expected from their fundamentals due to 
the existence of frictions or anomalies. In this paper, we empirically investigate why sovereign 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads comove ‘too’ much, or more than what one might 
expect based on economic similarities between countries. The use of a unique dataset with 
dealer-level intraday quotes helps us better understand the impact of dealers’ activity on 
CDS comovements. Pairs of sovereign CDS that share common dealers, specifically when 
those dealers display similar activity over time, tend to be more correlated, all else equal. We 
measure this common dealership, which we label Commonality in Quotes, as the correlation 
between the number of daily quotes reported by a given dealer to each of the two countries 
in a pair. 
Our main finding is that the Commonality in Quotes is a powerful driver of CDS 
abnormal return correlation, controlling for country similarities in default, liquidity, and macro 
variables. The effect is statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation 
increase in the Commonality in Quotes would lead to an increase equivalent to 17.3% of the 
average CDS abnormal return correlation, which we label CDS excess correlation. In fact, the 
economic impact of the Commonality in Quotes is stronger than that attributable to the 
remaining country-pair specific and global factors employed as explanatory variables. 
We posit that the mechanism causing the CDS excess correlation is the buying 
pressure faced by CDS dealers. Specifically, we conjecture that the common demand on a 
given pair of sovereign CDS is explained by the dealers’ urgency to buy protection in order to 
mitigate the credit risk in their portfolios and/or to lower regulatory capital requirements, 
especially in banks (Yorulmazer, 2013; Klingler and Lando, 2014; Hasan and Wu, 2016; 
Shan, Tang, and Yan, 2016; and Augustin, Sokolovski, Subrahmanyam, and Tomio, 2017). 
Sovereign CDS are appropriate instruments to hedge direct exposures to sovereign debt or 
hedge other assets whose value is correlated with the creditworthiness of the sovereign as 
banking or utility sectors (see April 2013 World Economic Outlook, IMF). Additionally, when a 
bank acquires a CDS against a risky investment, the bank can hold less capital against such 
investment. In particular, Hasan and Wu (2016) document that, among the potential uses of 
CDS by banks, they principally use CDS because of their benefits in terms of capital reliefs 
and credit enhancement. In fact, as stated by Yorulmazer (2013), AIG claimed that 72% of 
the notional amounts of CDS sold by AIG as of December 2007 were used by European and 
other banks for capital relief purposes. This willingness to trade exerts a pressure, increasing 
CDS premia in a way that is not necessarily related to the fundamentals of those CDS. As a 
consequence, when the dealer is active enough, and experiences this buying pressure in the 
CDS of two different countries, it will induce an extra or non-fundamental correlation 
between the CDS of those countries. If the mechanism is a fundamental one, through 
information, then there should be no difference between the strength of the effect associated 
to dealers facing buying pressure and the others. Thus, the exclusive effect of the former 
type of dealers is consistent with a non-fundamental friction in the CDS market originated by 
the dealers. It turns out that the CDS market is especially prone to having relative large 
players because it is dominated by the so called G14 dealers, who are the largest banks 
acting as derivatives dealers worldwide and hold roughly 90% of the CDS notional amount 
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(Mengle, 2010).1 In fact, we find that our Commonality in Quotes variable explains CDS 
excess comovement especially when most active dealers face buying pressure. 
The relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS excess correlation can 
also move in the opposite direction, so endogeneity could be a concern. For example, 
dealers could choose to provide more quotes to those pairs of countries whose CDS prices 
are more correlated. We deal with this issue with an instrumental variable approach. We use 
as instrument for dealers’ buying pressure the average Tier 1 capital ratio of a large group of 
international banks that are potential participants in the CDS market. The banks employed to 
obtain the average quarterly Tier 1 for a given pair of countries are those for which the 
sovereign debt of these countries has positive risk weights. To ensure the potential use of 
CDS for capital reliefs, we use banks in countries with a positive exposure to the official 
sectors of both countries forming the pair. Finally, to make the instrument as exogenous as 
possible, we use banks without headquarters or subsidiaries in any of the two countries 
forming the pair. The motivation for the use of this instrumental variable relies on the use of 
CDS by banks as credit risk mitigants to reduce the capital requirements for existing 
exposures. In the context of the Basel II Accord, banks should satisfy a minimum capital 
requirement defined as the ratio between core equity (or Tier 1 capital) and risk weighted 
assets (RWA). Thus, the demand on a given pair of sovereign CDS would be associated with 
the banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio and so, with the participants in the CDS market; but not with 
the ex-ante CDS comovement. In fact, the results of the first stage of the instrumental 
variable approach confirm that improvements in the average Tier 1 capital ratio are related to 
an active control of the RWA, through the demand of sovereign CDS for those countries 
whose bonds have positive risk weights. It supports the validity of the mechanism addressed 
in this paper of how dealers affect pricing, because otherwise we would not necessarily see 
a correlation of our specific instrument with our Commonality in Quotes variable. The results 
obtained from the endogeneity analysis, and from several extensions and additional tests, 
confirm that our finding is indeed rooted in a causal relationship between Commonality in 
Quotes and CDS excess comovement.  
Our findings link to two different strands of the literature. It first builds on a series of 
papers documenting an increasing trend in the comovements between the CDS spreads of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries during the recent crisis (i.e., Alter and Beyer 
(2014), Broto and Pérez-Quirós (2015), Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, and Rigobon (2013), 
or Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), among others). However, little is known about the effect 
of dealers’ liquidity provision on CDS price comovements. We contribute to this strand of the 
literature using information at the dealer level to study how their activity helps improve the 
explanatory power of such comovements. The importance of dealers’ activity in the CDS 
market is remarkable. Robert Pickel, CEO of ISDA, in his testimony before Congress on 
March 10, 2009, stated that 86% of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
trades were dealer-to-dealer.  
Secondly, our findings build on a series of papers related to the broader area of 
market frictions in financial markets. It is specifically linked to those papers documenting that 
market frictions make prices deviate from fundamentals or comove beyond fundamentals (see 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), and others). Our paper also relates to the stream of the 
                                                                          
1. The G14 dealers comprise Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, RBS, Societe Generale, UBS and Wells Fargo Bank. These 
dealers are the most active global derivatives dealers and are known as the G14 (see, for instance, ISDA Research Notes 
(2010) on the Concentration of OTC Derivatives among Major Dealers). 
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literature that investigates the relationship between common dealership and return 
commonality. In this vein, Pasquariello and Vega (2015) find that cross-price impact is greater 
among stocks dealt by the same specialist.2 Although there is a well-established body of 
studies postulating and providing evidence of excess comovement on stock prices, there is 
scarce evidence on this phenomenon in the CDS market. The analysis of excess comovements 
in an Over-the-Counter (OTC) market, as the sovereign CDS market, is of special interest for 
several reasons. First, according to Lin and Howe (1990), the market microstructure of the OTC 
market is different from that of organized exchanges. According to those authors, the 
multiplicity of market makers in the OTC market may allow insiders to more carefully conceal 
their trading. Second, sovereign CDS have become prevalent tools for risk analysis, and in fact, 
they are used in deriving estimates of default risk and in the calculation of regulatory and 
economic capital. Thus, understanding the forces in play in the CDS market seems of special 
relevance. In fact, Grossman and Hansen (2010) find that CDS are poor indicators of default in 
the financial crisis, given that they are influenced by many factors beyond the fundamental 
credit positions of countries concerned.  
 Our analysis focuses on the effect of friction-based trading on CDS price 
comovements. Some recent papers have studied the price impact of intraday CDS 
transactions in the presence of trading frictions. Shachar (2013) examines the role of liquidity 
provision by dealers in the CDS market and finds that order imbalances of end-users have a 
significant impact on price, which depends on the sign of the dealers’ inventory. Tang and Yan 
(2015) also document that, besides the traditional determinants, CDS spreads are affected by 
supply-demand imbalance being the effect of excess demand of a higher magnitude. Gehde-
Trapp, Gündüz, and Nasev (2015) show that CDS traders adjust their prices to the order flows 
they observe, with the adjustment of the premium growing stronger as inventory risk increases. 
Siriwardane (2014) measures CDS sellers’ capacity to supply CDS and documents that 
dealers’ risk-bearing capacities affect CDS prices.3 
We contribute to the above mentioned literature by documenting a cross-securities 
price pressure derived from non-fundamental-based demand channeled through the use of 
sovereign CDS by banks to reduce portfolio credit risk and/or to lower regulatory capital 
requirements. There is little evidence of this cross-asset price pressure in the sovereign CDS 
market. According to data provided by DTCC, sovereign CDS were among the top traded 
single-name contracts, including corporates, in terms of the net notional amount. Moreover, 
sovereign and corporate CDS contracts are known to be different (see Vogel, Bannier, and 
Heidorn (2013); and European Central Bank (ECB), (2009)). 
 Summarizing, the use of a unique dataset with dealer-level intraday quotes enables us 
to provide new evidence on the role of non-fundamental factors in explaining sovereign CDS 
comovements. Taken together, our results are consistent with the CDS premia containing a 
non-default-related component. This willingness towards a joint buy of sovereign CDS strongly 
contributes to causing comovement across their credit spreads. The economic magnitude of 
this non-fundamental-based trading is not negligible. This effect should be accounted for 
before using CDS as a measure of risk and/or contagion as recommended by some policy 
                                                                          
2. The comovement of securities’ liquidity due to the common dealership role of dealers as liquidity providers for more 
than one security has also been documented for the case of stocks (Coughenour and Saad, 2004) and bonds (Gissler, 
2017). Coughenour and Saad (2004) show that individual stock liquidity covaries with the liquidity of other stocks handled 
by the same specialist firm. Gissler (2017) shows that liquidity of single U.S. corporate bonds moves together with other 
bonds ׳ liquidity traded by the same dealers. 
3. The results obtained by Lou, Yan, and Zhang (2013) and Beetsma, Giuliodori, de Jong, and Hanson (2016) for 
sovereign bonds are also consistent with the theory of primary dealers’ limited risk-bearing capacity. 
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makers and academics4, or to obtain market-implied default risk estimates in advanced internal 
rating-based (IRB) approaches. Our results would also have implications for diversification 
purposes, given the distortion in CDS correlations that arises from this trading. A more 
transparent market would improve the informational efficiency of prices and comovements by 
lessening the impact of large dealers trading pressures. 
                                                                          
4. See, for instance, Gonzalez-Páramo (2011), Constancio (2012), or Hart and Zingales (2012). 
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2  Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data and Sample 
Intraday CDS quotes disaggregated at the dealer level come from a dataset provided by Credit 
Market Analysis (CMA hereafter) for 11 EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), spanning from January 
2008 to October 2011. The same information is employed for an additional sample of 39 non-
EMU countries from January 2010 to October 2011.  We primarily focus on the EMU countries 
for three reasons. First, the level of contagion among these countries during the crisis has been 
very strong and has persisted for a long period of time. Second, the activity in the EMU 
sovereign CDS contracts has increased significantly.5 Third, all of the CDS have similar 
characteristics in terms of currency, restructuring clauses, and timing. Although most of the 
action occurs in the European sovereign CDS, we extend our analysis to the whole universe of 
sovereign CDS contracts to confirm the robustness of our results, showing that the findings are 
not influenced by the strong credit risk contagion among European countries. 
CMA collects its intraday CDS quotes (both executable and indicative) from a robust 
consortium which consists of around 40 members from the buy-side community (hedge funds, 
asset managers, and investment banks) who are active participants in the CDS market.6,7 The 
quotes collected by CMA are provided by the sell-side (hereafter dealers) to the buy-side 
investors. As explained in Qiu and Yu (2012), the process of trading in the CDS market usually 
begins with clients receiving indicative quotes from dealers through information providers such 
as Bloomberg. They then initiate a request-for-quote with a single dealer or multiple dealers by 
phone, email, or through an electronic trading platform. Dealers can respond with competitive 
binding quotes, which often result in actual transactions. They can also respond with non-
competitive quotes with wide bid-ask spreads or choose not to provide quotes if they do not 
wish to trade. Each single quote in our sample corresponds to a single dealer whose identity is 
not observed, but is indicated through a randomized number that is maintained constant for 
each dealer over the sample period. Every quote offers information on the bid and ask prices 
and the time in which it is recorded. In fact, the daily data reported by CMA come from these 
intraday quotes that are aggregated to a daily frequency. Contrary to other CDS data venders, 
Credit Market Analysis (CMA) DataVision does not categorize its CDS prices along the 
“composite” or “consensus” lines but uses a strict aggregation methodology to offer daily 
prices depending on the intraday market activity. The data aggregation is not equally weighted 
but the different weights are based on the respective age and length of the original sample 
employed (the last contribution is more influential than the older ones). 
                                                                          
5. According to data provided by DTCC, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain were among the top 5 reference entities in 
terms of the net notional amount outstanding by September 2011, including sovereign and corporate references. Belgium, 
Austria and Portugal were in 11th, 12th, and 14th place, respectively. Compared to the remaining sovereign CDS, the net 
amount outstanding for the 11 EMU countries in our sample ($108 billion) was 1.33 larger than for the rest of the sovereign 
CDS ($81 billion) by January 2010.  
6. The term buy-side should be viewed from the perspective of securities exchange services that the buy-side uses to 
trade securities; whereas the sell-side, also called prime brokers, are the sellers of those services. Thus, the buy-side 
investors in the CDS market can be either protection buyers or sellers. 
7. The buy-side community includes major credit-focused houses that receive up to 20,000 e-mail pricing messages a 
day, covering a wide array of credits; and boutique experts focusing on niche credits. These contributors are spread 
geographically across Europe and the US. Each of these members contributes their CDS prices to a CMA database which 
they receive in Bloomberg formatted messages (as well as forms) from their sell-side dealers. Hence, CMA has access to a 
constant stream and continuously evolving pool of CDS data. The access to OTC communication between buy-side 
trading desks and their counterparties guarantees that the prices received by CMA from the buy-side community are very 
likely to be tradable or even executable prices, and that they capture market conditions as they evolve throughout the day. 
Of course, it is difficult to know precisely whether all of them are tradable or not (Mayordomo, Peña and Schwartz, 2014). 
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The CDS quotes employed in this study are 5-year maturity contracts (the most liquid 
ones) denominated in US Dollars. For those observations for which we only have information 
on the CDS up-front prices and not for the CDS spreads,8 we calculate the spread following 
the ISDA CDS Standard Model to convert up-front payments into spreads.9 To guarantee a 
minimum level of synchronicity across EMU countries, we exclude quotes outside the main 
working hours (7am to 8pm GMT+1) and quotes given on Saturdays and Sundays.10 
Information related to control variables comes from other sources and will be further explained 
in subsequent subsections. 
Table I reports the summary statistics of the final sample of CDS quotes and the 
share of quotes by dealers. Panel A disaggregates the total number of quotes and dealers 
for the EMU countries, as well as the daily average, at the country level. Each country has an 
average of approximately half a million quotes and more than 650 daily quotes on average. 
There is an average of 28 different dealers giving quotes for each country on a daily basis. 
Each country has approximately 90 different dealers. Panel B contains the aggregate 
descriptive statistics for the EMU and non-EMU countries. For comparability reasons (due to 
data availability for the non-EMU countries) the sample spans from January 2010 to October 
2011. In this sample of countries we use all available quotes, independently of the reporting 
time due to the different time zones. This panel confirms that the activity in the 11 EMU 
countries is higher than the observed in the remaining 39 non-EMU countries, both in terms 
of the total and the daily average number of quotes. These figures reinforce the importance 
of understanding the effect of dealers’ common quotes on the comovements of most liquid 
CDS. In fact, for this sub-period, the average number of daily quotes for each individual EMU 
country is around 838, versus 229 for each individual non-EMU country. The total and the 
average number of dealers reporting prices on a daily basis for the two groups of countries 
are very similar. 
Panel C shows that the 10 most active dealers provide 45.9% of the total number of 
quotes in our sample, and the 30 most active dealers account for 90.8% of the total quotes. 
This feature emphasizes the high concentration in dealership in the CDS market.  
A summary of the dynamics of the monthly correlation of daily sovereign CDS returns 
for countries i and j in month t ሺߩ௜௝௧ሻ for the sample of 11 EMU countries (55 different country-
pairs) for the period of January 2008 to October 2011 is shown in Panel A of Figure 1. CDS 
returns refer to the percentage change in the daily CDS spread, and it is obtained as the first 
difference in the logarithm of the CDS spreads.11 The daily CDS spreads come from Markit 
instead of CMA to avoid any dependence on the method used by CMA to compute daily prices 
from the intraday contributions of dealers.12 The figure shows the median of ߩ௜௝௧, jointly with the 
5th and 95th percentiles. From the beginning of the sample to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
we observe a wide dispersion across correlations ranging from -0.56 to 0.93. Since September 
2008, the median of the correlations has fluctuated steadily between 0.43 and 0.86. The 5th 
                                                                          
8. Some dealers only provide up-front prices for Greece after April 2011. 
9. http://www.cdsmodel.com/ 
10. Quotes outside these hours and on weekends are scarce; in fact, they represent 2.25% of all observations. Due to the 
low percentage of excluded quotes, we find similar results when we include them in our analysis. 
11. We use the percent change in CDS spreads as in Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015). However, as these authors state, 
this implicit return is economically different from the excess return on a corporate bond implied by the identical CDS 
spreads, as considered by Berndt and Obreja (2010). For a detailed description of the logic of computing CDS returns as 
percent changes in CDS spreads see Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2015). 
12. As detailed in Mayordomo, Peña, and Schwartz (2014), the Markit Group collects CDS quotes contributed by more 
than 30 major market participants on a daily basis. The quotes are subject to filtering that removes outliers and stale 
observations. Markit then computes a daily composite spread only if it has two or more contributors. 
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and 95th bands show a small dispersion in March 2009 consistent with the implementation of 
the economic stimulus package in the US. On the contrary, we observe a greater dispersion 
since May 2010 when there is a sizeable decrease in correlations in the 5th percentile. This 
comes as a consequence of the disproportionately large increase of the Greek and other 
peripheral CDS premia in comparison to the core countries’ CDS premia. 
Our regression analysis relies on the correlations among sovereign abnormal or 
filtered CDS returns (instead of CDS returns), which we labeled “CDS excess correlation”.  
These correlations can be interpreted as a contagion according to Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng 
(2005), who define contagion as “excess correlation, that is, correlation over and above what 
one would expect from economic fundamentals.” Like Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), we 
take an asset pricing perspective on measuring economic fundamentals and identify 
contagion through the correlation of an asset pricing model’s residuals. These residuals are 
obtained from a monthly regression in which the dependent variable is the daily CDS return 
of a given country obtained from Markit and the explanatory variables are three factors 
related to the CDS, bond, and stock markets. In the part of the analysis that involves only 
EMU countries, we estimate the filtered daily CDS returns for a given country i by regressing 
its CDS returns on the following factors: (i) country i’s stock market index returns, (ii) the 
returns on the country’s benchmark 5-year sovereign bond, and (iii) a sovereign CDS 
industry-specific index that is constructed from European countries by Thomson Financial 
based on the Thomson Reuters composite CDS data.13 The average R-squared of the 
monthly regressions for the each individual country is 0.57. In the part of the analysis that 
involves the entire universe of sovereign CDS, we use the same three factors, except that for 
the CDS market factor we use an equally-weighted average daily CDS returns of all countries 
in the sample excluding the country under analysis (because there is no constructed index 
available for the rest of the countries as a group). 
We denote the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns for countries 
i and j in month t as ߩ௜௝௧∗ . Panel B of Figure 1 shows the median of ߩ௜௝௧∗ , jointly with the 5th and 
95th percentiles. This variable fluctuates between 0.1 and 0.8 and exhibits a higher variation 
than the series in Panel A of Figure 1. The average CDS excess correlation across the EMU 
countries over the sample period (0.36) is much lower than the CDS correlation (0.64). The 
CDS excess correlation reaches its highest levels in September 2008 and April 2010 coinciding 
with Lehman Brothers’ collapse and the month before the Greek bailout. 
Table II reports the descriptive statistics of the monthly correlation of daily sovereign 
CDS returns and filtered returns and the monthly commonalities in quotes for countries i and 
j. The inclusion of Greece increases the average level of the CDS premium due to the high 
level of credit risk in the Greek CDS after 2010. Nevertheless, the inclusion/exclusion of 
Greece from the sample does not lead to strong differences in the level of the commonalities 
in quotes or the CDS excess correlations. These commonalities, as well as the correlation 
between CDS filtered returns, exhibit an upward trend from the levels observed in 2008 that 
remain high from 2009 onwards. Nevertheless, the CDS excess correlations exhibit a weaker 
upward trend. 
  
                                                                          
13. This equally-weighted index is available via Thomson DataStream (DS Mnemonic: DSESV5E) and reflects an average 
mid-spread calculation of the index’s constituents. The only traded index on European sovereign CDS (SovX Western 
Europe) began trading on September 28, 2009. This index consists of 15 countries, but its start date is far away from the 
beginning of our sample. 
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2.2 Measuring Commonality in Quotes 
2.2.1 COMMONALITY IN QUOTES 
Two countries will be more connected if they have many dealers in common and if those 
dealers are similarly active in giving quotes to those countries. We average across dealers the 
correlation of the number of quotes given by each dealer d to both countries i and j in month t. 
We label this variable Commonality in Quotes (CQ), and define it as: 
ܥܳ௜௝௧ ൌ 		෍ωௗ௧corrሺܰܳ௜ௗ௧, ܰܳ௝ௗ௧ሻ
஽೟
ௗୀଵ
∈ ሾെ1,1ሿ 
 1 ) 
where ܰܳ௜ௗ௧ and ܰܳ௝ௗ௧ are the number of daily quotes given to country i and country j, 
respectively, by dealer d in a given month t, and Dt is the total number of dealers reporting 
quotes to both countries i and j in month t. If dealer d does not report quotes for a country on a 
certain day, we impute a zero value for that day. The correlation of quotes coming from a very 
active dealer should weigh more than the correlation coming from a dealer that gives very few 
quotes. As a consequence, the Commonality in Quotes is a weighted average of the monthly 
correlation between the number of daily quotes reported by all dealers to countries i and j in 
which the weight assigned to dealer d in month t (߱ௗ௧) is defined as follows: 
߱ௗ௧ ൌ minሺܶܳ௜ௗ௧, ܶܳ௝ௗ௧ሻ∑ minሺܶܳ௜ௗ௧, ܶܳ௝ௗ௧ሻ஽ௗୀଵ   2 ) 
where ܶܳ௜ௗ௧ and ܶܳ௝ௗ௧ are the total number of quotes given by dealer d to countries i and j at 
month t, respectively, such that the numerator of equation (2) measures the importance of 
dealer d giving common quotes to countries i and j. If a dealer gives 1 quote to France and 10 
quotes to Spain, we say that France and Spain only share “1 common quote” from that dealer, 
the minimum of the two. The denominator is the sum of the numerator to ensure that the sum 
of  ߱ௗ௧ across all dealers in each month is equal to one. 
This measure, Commonality in Quotes, captures how connected two countries are, 
depending on the activity, size, and number of dealers handling CDS for those two countries. 
We hypothesize that if there is a very active dealer giving many quotes to two countries in a 
pair, the CDS of those countries will exhibit a high level of comovement. 
Figure 2 shows the median of the variable Commonality in Quotes obtained from 
equation (1), together with its 5th and 95th percentile bands. We observe that from the 
beginning of the sample to May 2009, the median displays an upward trend increasing from 
0.48 to 0.91 while the 5th and 95th percentiles tighten, reaching the tightest point in May 
2009. There is a clear and significant time-series variation in this variable and a relatively high 
dispersion across the different countries in the sample, in view of the 5th and 95th 
percentiles.  
2.2.2 COMMONALITY IN QUOTES AND DEALER’S TRADING PRESSURE 
We now turn to a more disaggregated version of the Commonality in Quotes. Consistent with 
seminal papers on market microstructure (see for instance Ho and Stoll, 1983), we consider 
that a dealer who is willing to reduce her position in CDS will decrease both the bid and ask 
prices. On the contrary, a dealer who is willing to buy CDS (and not sell) gives a high bid and 
ask price to ensure the purchase and deter additional buyers. This willingness towards a joint 
sale or joint buy of the CDS of a given pair of countries could lead to greater comovement. If 
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that dealer is active enough, the CDS spreads quoted for the two countries would change 
simultaneously due to the dealer’s activity, but not because of the two countries’ similarities in 
fundamentals. 
To capture the effect of trading based on buying or selling pressure, we break down 
the variable Commonality in Quotes in three variables. Commonality in Quotes from Buying 
Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ሻ is defined as in equation (1), but using quotes from those dealers facing 
buying pressure. These dealers are willing to buy CDS but less willing to sell protection and so, 
they are supposed to give high bid and ask quotes relative to other dealers. We consider that a 
dealer d faces buying pressure on countries i and j when her average bid price and ask price in 
month t are above the 66th percentile of the distribution of all dealers’ bid and ask prices for 
both countries. In the same vein, Commonality in Quotes from Selling Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧ௌ 	ሻ is 
defined using quotes from those dealers facing selling pressure on countries i and j. It occurs 
when her average bid price and ask price are below the 33rd percentile of those distributions.14 
Finally, we obtain Commonality not from Buying or Selling Pressure (ܥܳே஻ௌሻ computed with 
those dealers that are not in the B or S category.  
ܥܳ௜௝௧௟ ൌ 		෍ωௗ௧௟ corr	ሺܰܳ௜ௗ௧௟ , ܰܳ௝ௗ௧௟ ሻ
஽೟೗
ௗୀଵ
∈ ሾെ1,1ሿ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݈ ൌ ܤ, ܵ, ܰܤܵ 
 3 ) 
where l denotes whether dealer d reporting CDS quotes to countries i and j faces buying 
pressure (B) or selling pressure (S) or none (NBS) in both countries i and j. Thus, we have a 
commonality variable for each of the three previous possibilities. The notation is similar to the 
one employed in the baseline commonality variable, but now ܰܳ௜ௗ௧௟  and ܰܳ௝ௗ௧௟  are the number 
of quotes given to country i and country j, respectively, by dealer d with a level of trading 
pressure l in a given month t. Regarding the weights (ωௗ௧௟ ሻ, they are obtained as in equation (2) 
but considering separately the dealers in the category of trading pressure l to countries i and j 
at time t, respectively. ܦ௧௟ denotes the total number of dealers in each of the three categories, 
denoting the degree of trading pressure l reporting quotes to both countries i and j in month t. 
2.3 Modeling Sovereign CDS Comovement 
The following equation represents the panel estimate regression explaining the monthly 
correlation of daily sovereign CDS excess returns for countries i and j in month ݐ ൫ߩ௜௝௧∗ ൯ for the 
sample of 11 EMU countries (55 different country-pairs) for the period from January 2008 to 
October 2011: 
ߩ௜௝௧∗ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ ∗ ܥܳ௜௝௧ ൅෍ ܾ௞ ∗ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௞௜௝௧
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜௝,௧ 
4) 
where ܥܳ௜௝௧ refers to our measure of Commonality in Quotes that dealers give to both 
countries in the pair at month t obtained from equation (1) as defined in Section II.B.  
ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௞௜௝௧ contains the set of k controls that include a group of pair-level variables and 
global risk factors. All of these controls are explained in the following subsection and are 
defined as contemporaneous to the dependent variable. We apply the Fisher’s z-
transformation to all variables that are correlation coefficients.15 Thus, both the dependent 
variable and the variable of interest (CQ), among other controls, are transformed with this 
                                                                          
14. We use these percentiles to guarantee a minimum number of observations to compute the correlations. We require 
that the dealers provide quotes for at least two days to consider their quotes in the computation of the commonality 
measure. 
15.. The equation used for the Fisher’s z-transformation of each correlation coefficient (r) is as follows: (0.5*[ln(1+r)-ln(1-r)]). 
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method. The standard errors are double-clustered at the country-pair and month levels. In two 
different specifications we use the two versions of CQ: the baseline one and the disaggregated 
one in trading pressure faced by dealers. 
2.4 Controls 
This set of variables accounts for differences and similarities between two countries that may 
potentially affect the comovements in the CDS spreads. We control for three groups of 
country-pair specific variables: credit risk of financial institutions, CDS liquidity, and 
macroeconomic variables. For every pair of countries, we measure the monthly correlation of 
each of the above variables, computed using daily observations. Given the lower frequency of 
the macroeconomic variables however, we use the absolute value of their difference to proxy 
for the similarities in terms of macro fundamentals. 
Credit risk of financial institutions: Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) document a 
significant comovement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS after the announcement of 
financial sector bailouts in the Eurozone. As a consequence, the stronger the relationship 
between the financial sectors of two given countries, the more easily the shocks to financial 
institutions in the first country affect the sovereign sector of the second country. To control for 
this comovement, we consider the correlation between the log return of the CDS spreads of 
the banking sectors of the corresponding countries (Corr. Country Banks CDS Log Ret.). 
CDS liquidity: Previous literature has documented the existence of a liquidity premium 
in sovereign CDS prices; thus, the higher the correlation between the liquidity premium of two 
countries, the larger the correlation in CDS prices would be. To proxy for the effect of liquidity in 
the comovements, we use the correlation between the sovereign CDS liquidity (Corr. CDS 
Relative Bid-Ask), proxied by the relative bid-ask spread (i.e., bid-ask spread relative to the 
mid-spread).  
Macro variables: We consider two macro fundamentals in our analysis: government 
debt and the government net deficit/surplus relative to GDP. Using these variables, we proxy 
for the stock of debt in countries and the accumulated deficit. They have been found to have 
significant effects on the sovereign CDS spreads in Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) 
and Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), among others. We use the absolute differences in relative 
debt (Abs|Debt to GDPi - Debt to GDPj|) and deficits (Abs|Deficit to GDPi - Deficit to GDPj|) to 
measure the similarities across countries in terms of these two variables. 
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) study the nature of sovereign credit 
risk based on CDS spreads, and show that the majority of sovereign credit risk can be linked to 
global factors (a single principal component accounts for 64% of the variation in sovereign 
credit spreads). In view of this, it is highly plausible that all correlations are driven by a common 
set of factors besides the pair specific similarities or differences. For this reason, we include 
global risk factors in the regression model to rule out common aggregate factors that move all 
correlations up or down together. Specifically, we use the percentage change of the following 
global risk factors:16  
                                                                          
16. Given that the regression is performed on a monthly basis, we first compute the monthly average of each variable and 
then we obtain the percentage change with respect to the previous month. We use the percentage change to be 
consistent with the definition of the rest of the variables. In addition we repeat the same exercise using the global factors in 
levels and obtained similar results. 
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Systemic risk: We measure systemic risk by means of the 3-month Euribor-OIS spread 
(ΔLog Euribor-OIS), that was found to be one of the most reliable measures of this risk in 
Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2013). Bhansali, Gingrich, and Longstaff (2008) document in the 
context of the subprime crisis and based on credit derivatives markets that systemic credit risk 
has become a much larger fraction of total credit risk. For this reason, we expect that 
exacerbations in the level of systemic risk are accompanied by increases in CDS comovements. 
Sovereign and corporate credit risk: Bond yields and spreads represent an alternative 
measure of credit risk to CDS spreads. We use a synthetic Euro benchmark bond to measure 
the sovereign risk in the euro area (ΔLog EA Treasury Yield). Moreover, we use the investment 
grade spread, which is obtained as the difference between the BBB- and AAA-rated euro 
corporate bond yield indices, to proxy for corporate credit risk. We expect stronger 
comovements during periods of higher financial stress.  
Counterparty risk: The higher the counterparty risk, the lower the confidence among 
institutional investors in the CDS market, and thus, the more difficult it is to find a counterparty 
to buy or sell protection, the lower the market activity and the higher the correlation risk. As in 
Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012), we use the dealers’ CDS spreads to construct the 
counterparty risk variable. We follow Arce, Mayordomo, and Peña’s (2013) methodology, and 
proxy counterparty risk in the CDS market through the first principal component obtained from 
the CDS spreads of the main 14 banks that act as dealers in that market (ΔLog Counterparty). 
Risk premium: The risk premium has been found to have a positive effect on credit risk 
in existing literature (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). We measure this risk premium by means of 
the Euro Stoxx 50 index (ΔLog EUROSTOXX50).   
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3 Results 
3.1 Determinants of Comovements 
3.1.1 BASELINE ANALYSIS 
Table III reports our baseline results. We employ two alternative specifications for which we 
report the results without (column (1)) and with (column (2)) the Commonality in Quotes variable 
to emphasize its power in explaining comovements. Both columns (1) and (2) contain all the 
control variables plus time effects. Regarding the new variable included in column (2), we 
observe a positive and significant effect of the Commonality in Quotes variable: increases in the 
common quotes significantly increase the correlation between the sovereign CDS excess 
returns. Concretely, an increase of 1% in Commonality in Quotes increases the correlation 
between their CDS excess returns by 0.14%, ceteris paribus. Apart from being statistically 
significant, the explanatory power of this variable seems to be sizeable, because the R-squared 
increases 23%: from 8.6% to 10.6% after its inclusion in the regression. 
Regarding the control variables, we observe that, consistent with the existence of a 
significant liquidity premium in CDS spreads, the stronger the relationship between the liquidity 
of the CDS contracts for a given pair of countries, the stronger the comovements in their 
prices. The similarities in the degree of the countries’ deficits and indebtedness play a 
significant role in comovements: if two given countries exhibit a high ratio of deficit relative to 
GDP or debt to GDP, the market tends to push their CDS in the same direction. The only 
global variable that exhibits a weakly significant effect on the dependent variable is the Euribor-
OIS spread. This supports the evidence documented by Bhansali, Gingrich, and Longstaff 
(2008) according to whom systemic credit risk has become a much larger fraction of total 
credit risk. It is not surprising that the rest of the global variables are insignificant in the 
specification, given that we filter CDS returns with a three factor model that includes stock, 
bond, and CDS indices, which already incorporate the variability in global fundamentals, that 
should captured by the global variables used in this regression analysis.  
We next analyze the economic significance of the variables according to the baseline 
results obtained in column (2).  It is obtained from the product of the estimated coefficient and 
the standard deviation of each independent variable. The results are reported in column (3). 
The coefficient with the largest economic significance is the one of Commonality in Quotes. A 
change equal to one standard deviation of the previous variable would lead to an increase in 
the average excess correlation between the CDS of a given pair of countries equal to 0.052 
units. This increase is equivalent to 17.4% of the dependent variable across the sample period 
(0.299). In view of these results, we conclude that our simple measure of commonality in the 
quotes that dealers provide for CDS of EMU countries is a powerful driver of the variation in 
CDS excess correlations.  
The revision of the misleading statistics of fiscal deficits by the Greek authorities in 
November 2009 was the immediate trigger of the European sovereign debt crisis. We analyze 
the potential effect of the most influential event in the sample by excluding Greece from our 
baseline analysis, in Table IV, column (1), and splitting the sample into two sub-periods using 
this event as the break point: pre-crisis (column (2)), and crisis (column (3)). Independently of 
the exclusion of Greece and the sample period employed in our analysis, we find that the 
Commonality in Quotes has a positive and significant effect on the CDS excess comovement.  
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3.1.2 ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND EXTENSIONS  
This section contains a number of robustness tests. The first test concerns the use of alternative 
frequencies and alternative sample of countries in the regression analysis. The second test deals 
with the potential bias generated by the lack of trading in a given contract, whereas the third one 
poses an alternative methodology based on the dealers’ characteristics and trading behavior. An 
additional battery of robustness tests is reported in the Internet Appendix. 
a. Alternative Frequencies and Alternative Sample of Countries	
We next show that the effect of the commonality does not depend on the data frequency 
employed. To that end, we use an alternative time frame in our analysis to build on the results 
obtained with monthly frequency. Thus, we perform a regression analysis in which the variables 
are defined at weekly frequency. For instance, the Commonality in Quotes is obtained as in 
equation (1) but by computing weekly correlations from the number of quotes per day. The 
same procedure is applied to the rest of correlation variables and for the global variables we 
take the weekly average.17 Regarding the remaining independent variables, the absolute 
differences for a given pair of countries in the ratios of debt and deficit to GDP are those used 
in Table III and have a quarterly frequency. As shown in column (1) of Table V, independently on 
whether we perform the regressions on a monthly or weekly basis, the variable of interest still 
plays a significant role on the CDS comovements.  
To analyze whether the results in our paper are short-lived or not, we test whether the 
commonalities in quotes are powerful predictors of CDS comovements one week ahead. For 
that aim, we estimate a variation of equation (4) in which all explanatory variables are lagged 
one week. The results are reported in column (2) of Table V. We observe that the coefficient 
associated to the Commonality in Quotes is not statistically different from zero suggesting that 
this effect is contemporaneous or short-lived. This result is consistent with the signature 
prediction of asset markets with frictions, stating that frictions tend to disappear and align more 
closely with fundamentals. 
Finally, to ensure that the results are not due to the strong similarities among the 11 
EMU countries forming the sample, we next extend our analysis to the entire universe of 
sovereign CDS for which there are regular quotes. This leads to a final sample that consists of 
50 countries (39 non-EMU countries) for the sample period 2010-2011. Column (4) of Table V 
contains the results obtained for the baseline specification extended to all countries.18 We still 
find a positive and strongly significant effect of commonalities. 
b.  Dealing with the lack of trading 
The dealer commonality measure could be biased towards the excess commonality by 
counting in non-tradable quotes. This upward bias could affect ultimately the effect of the 
commonality in quotes on the CDS comovements. For this reason we perform several 
robustness tests, to deal with the potential biases caused by non-traded contracts. 
We first remove from the sample the most inactively traded countries. We cannot 
differentiate the tradable and non-tradable quotes in our dataset. However, we exploit the 
information in DTCC that contains the number of contracts traded in a given week. We 
                                                                          
17. Instead of using weekly averages in a given week we use the last observation available one week before and obtain 
similar results. 
18. Due to the lack of information on the banking sector CDS spreads of many non-EMU countries, we substitute the 
credit risk of the financial institution control variable by the absolute difference of bank nonperforming loans to total gross 
loans defined on an annual basis (Abs|NPLTLi - NPLTLj|). 
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consider as actively traded contracts those ones traded every week in a given month and as 
inactively traded contracts those in which there is not trading in at least one week of the month. 
The results reported in column (1) of Table VI correspond to the sample formed by European 
countries, and are obtained using all the contracts and months for which there is information in 
DTCC (i.e., November 2008 – October 2011). The results contained in column (2) refer to the 
case in which we remove the inactively traded contracts. Concretely, the sample consists of 
pairs of countries in which both countries are actively traded. The coefficient in column (2) is 
similar to the one in column (1) in which the whole sample of European countries is used for the 
analysis. In fact, the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically different from 
zero. In addition, the economic impact of commonalities on the comovement, which is 
obtained as the product of the coefficient and the standard deviation of the corresponding 
measure of commonality, exhibit a relatively similar magnitude, suggesting that there is not an 
overestimation of the effect of commonalities due to the presence of non-actively traded 
contracts. The fact that the two coefficients exhibit the same order of magnitude could be due 
to the similar number of observations used in the two regressions given that the European 
sovereign CDS contracts are very actively traded. For this reason, we extend the sample to the 
whole universe of sovereign CDS and perform a similar analysis. We observe that the 
coefficient obtained for both traded and non-traded contracts (column 3) is in fact lower than 
the one obtained for countries that are traded (column 4). The difference between both 
coefficients is statistically different from zero and the economic impact of the measure of 
commonalities in quotes is higher under the specification used in column (4) discarding an 
upward bias caused by non-traded contracts. 
As a second attempt to deal with this issue, we perform two similar analyses that are 
implemented based on pairs formed by non-actively traded countries and pairs formed by an 
actively traded country and another one that is not. To perform these analyses with a reasonable 
number of observations in each regression, we propose a new classification to define actively and 
non-actively traded countries. For each month we compute the 33th and 66th percentiles from the 
distribution of the number of contracts traded on the sample of countries. Then, we define a 
contract for a given country as non-actively traded if the number of traded contracts on that 
country in that month is below the percentile 33th, whereas actively traded contracts are those 
that are above the 66th percentile.19 The results obtained when the sample consists of pairs 
formed by non-actively traded contracts according to the new definition are reported in column (5) 
whereas the ones obtained for pairs in which a contract is actively traded and the other is not are 
reported in column (6). A formal test to compare the magnitude of the coefficients reveals that the 
coefficient in column (5) is not statistically different from the one obtained under the baseline 
specification for the whole universe of countries (i.e., column (3)) whereas the one in column (6) is 
significantly lower than the baseline coefficient. Similar conclusions are inferred if we attend to the 
economic impact of the commonalities in quotes on the dependent variable. 
c. Dealers characteristics and trading behavior 
In this subsection we conduct a complementary analysis that provides additional evidence on 
the return comovements due to common dealers. We consider that a given pair of CDS has a 
common dealer if the specialist in both countries is the same. To define a dealer as a specialist 
in a given CDS contract, we consider a variation of the term specialist in Coughenour and Saad 
(2004). Their analysis relies on the NYSE specialist system according to which specialists are 
those traders that specialize in a particular stock by maintaining a fixed position at a post on 
the NYSE floor and execute orders for other brokers. 
                                                                          
19. We have used other percentile 25th / 75th, and the median to split the contracts as actively and non-actively traded, 
and both obtain similar results. 
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Our data corresponds to an OTC market for which there is not a formal definition of 
specialist, and thus we propose a method to classify market makers as specialists depending 
on their quoting activity. To that aim, we use the whole universe of sovereign CDS. It 
guarantees the existence of a higher number of CDS contracts that are traded by different 
dealers, such that each country or group of countries has different specialists. Although our 
dataset consists of quotes, we get information from DTCC on the number of contracts traded 
in a given week. This information enables us to assign the best bid and ask quotes to potential 
purchases and sales of CDS. As a first attempt, to construct the inventory for each dealer we 
order the bid and ask prices obtained from the dealers in a type of limit order book, in which 
we assume that the highest (lowest) bid (ask) prices within a given week are the most likely 
ones to end up in trades. This strategy enables us to “infer” the number of contracts traded by 
each dealer each week and to aggregate them at the monthly level, which allows us to classify 
them as specialists in a given country. We consider three alternative methods to classify 
specialist dealers: 
a) A dealer whose average number of monthly trades, independently on whether 
they are purchases or sales, is the highest across all dealers. 
b) A dealer with the highest number of accumulated trades independently on 
whether they are purchases or sales. 
c) A dealer that has been the most active trader in the highest number of weeks. 
One could argue that the price variation within a given week could be so high that the 
creation of the limit order book on a weekly basis is not adequate. For that reason, we define 
the limit order book at a daily level, and assume that the best bid and ask prices in a given day 
are the ones that are more likely to be tradable. To that end, we divide the number of trades in 
a given week by the number of banking days in that week to determine the dealers that are 
taking either long or short positions that day. When the result of the division is not an entire 
number we distribute the remaining trades within the week days proportionally to the number 
of quotes in each day. Finally, we define three measures of specialists in agreement with the 
measures a) – c) detailed above. 
Based on the definition a) obtained on a daily basis (i.e., average number of monthly 
trades), our sample consists of 5 specialists and so, on average, each specialist acts as such in 
more than 8 countries out of the 41 used in the regression analysis. The most frequent 
specialist is specialized in 17 countries (i.e., around 41.5% of the countries in the sample). This 
suggests that there exists certain heterogeneity that could help us to define a “dealer factor” 
following Coughenour and Saad’s (2004) methodology. These authors rely on the liquidity 
market model used by Chordia et al. (2000) to provide evidence of positive time-series stock 
liquidity co-variation, and extend it by incorporating information about the specialist firm 
portfolio. It enables Coughenour and Saad (2004) to document the existence of stock liquidity 
comovement with the liquidity of other stocks handled by the same specialist firm.  
Our analysis relies on CDS returns instead of liquidity, but we adapt Coughenour and 
Saad’s (2004) model specification to our data to understand the existence of comovement in 
CDS returns with the returns of other CDSs handled by the same specialist. For that aim we 
extend a market model where the dependent variable is the CDS return, which is regressed on 
a market factor and a dealer factor: 
ܦܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܦܯ݇ݐܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦܵ݌ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧					ሺ5ሻ 
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where ܦܯ݇ݐܥܦ ௧ܵ is the market factor for the CDS of country i, that is defined as the average 
CDS daily return across the remaining 40 countries. The dealer factor for country i is defined as 
the average daily return across all the countries with the same specialist as country i, excluding 
this country. Thus, the variable ܦܵ݌ܥܦ ௜ܵ௧ denotes the country i’s specialist portfolio returns that 
is obtained as the average daily return across all the countries that share the same specialist, 
excluding country i. The correlation between the market and dealer factors is around 0.75, 
which suggests that the dealer factor is indeed distinguishable from the market factor, and 
consequently we do not have an identification problem.20 
This regression is implemented for each definition of specialist, and the results are 
contained in Table VII. We report the average estimate for the two factors and the t-statistic 
associated to a test that analyses if the average estimate across all the countries is statistically 
different from zero. Results in columns (1) – (3) refer to the case in which the trades are 
assigned on a weekly basis whereas results in columns (4) - (6) correspond to the case in 
which the trades are assigned on a daily basis. The results show that in fact the coefficients 
associated to both the market and dealer factors are positive and statistically different from 
zero for all the specialist definitions, and confirm that the dealer commonality has a strong 
explanatory power beyond market factors. In sum, this analysis provides further evidence in 
favor of the existence of comovement in CDS prices derived from the dealers that actively give 
quotes to a given pair or group of countries. 
3.2 Comovements and Dealers’ Trading Pressure 
In this section, we perform a test to analyze the effect of the commonalities obtained from 
dealers facing trading pressure. We disaggregate the Commonality in Quotes into three 
different variables: one coming from Buying Pressure, another from Selling Pressure, and the 
last one not from Buying or Selling Pressure. This test is especially important because it helps 
us disentangle the origin of the effect. If the mechanism is a fundamental one, through 
information, then there should be no difference between the strength of the effect of the three 
different disaggregated variables. If, however, we find stronger effect from buying or selling 
pressure variables than the non-buying or selling (as we do), then it is consistent with a friction 
that is non-fundamental. As detailed in Section II.B, we consider common high (low) ask and 
bid prices for a given pair of countries to define dealers facing buying (selling) pressure. The 
commonalities obtained from dealers facing buying (selling) pressure for a given pair of 
countries are denoted as ܥܳ௜௝௧஻  (ܥܳ௜௝௧ௌ ሻ while the ones obtained from dealers who do not face 
trading pressure are denoted as ܥܳ௜௝௧ே஻ௌ. The results obtained for the joint use of the three types 
of commonalities are reported in column (1) of Table VIII. We observe that the effect of 
commonalities obtained from dealers facing buying pressure is significantly different from zero, 
while that for dealers facing selling pressure and those who do not face either buying or selling 
pressure is not. 21 The coefficients of the remaining control variables remain unchanged. It 
suggests that dealers willing to increase their positions in a given pair of EMU countries 
contribute to increasing the CDS prices of those countries and, consequently, their correlation. 
This supports Shachar’s (2013) finding that the contemporaneous price impact of buying is 
much larger than the immediate price impact of selling. Moreover, the role of dealers buying 
                                                                          
20. The correlation coefficient is not far away from the average correlation coefficient between the change in market 
portfolio spreads and specialist portfolio spreads obtained by Coughenour and Saad (2004), which is roughly 0.70. The 
adjusted R-squared in the multivariate regression is higher than the ones obtained for the regressions with a single factor 
(either the market or the dealer factors) which confirms that near-multicollinearity should not influence the precision of the 
coefficient estimates (see Greene, 1990, p. 280). 
21. A given dealer d is considered as facing buying (selling) pressure for countries i and j when her average bid and ask 
prices are above (below) the 66th (33rd) percentile in both countries. The use of the 25th and 75th percentiles delivers 
similar results but leads to a lower number of observations to implement the analysis. 
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pressure on CDS prices and comovements is supported by the increase in the real demand of 
dealers in the sovereign CDS market that exhibit an increasing trend since mid-2009 (see 
Klingler and Lando, 2014). These results are also in agreement with those obtained by 
Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) and Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2011), 
among others, on the contribution of demand pressure to derivatives pricing. 
Our finding is consistent with dealers being less willing to sell protection and further 
increasing their exposure to counterparty risk and to the default of a given EMU country. The 
effect of demand pressure on CDS comovements could be explained by the use of sovereign 
CDS as credit risk mitigants to reduce portfolio credit risk and/or to lower regulatory capital 
requirements. Sovereign CDS are appropriate instruments to hedge direct exposures to 
sovereign debt or hedge other assets whose value is correlated with the creditworthiness of the 
sovereign as banking or utility sectors (see April 2013 World Economic Outlook, IMF). 
Additionally, when a bank acquires a CDS against a risky investment, the bank can hold less 
capital against such investment. The use of CDS to lower regulatory capital requirements and 
to free up capital on banks’ balance sheet has been addressed by Yorulmazer (2013), Klingler 
and Lando (2014), Hasan and Wu (2016), Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016), and Augustin, 
Sokolovski, Subrahmanyam, and Tomio (2017).22,23   
There are additional frictions and features of the sovereign CDS market that could help 
explain the role of common quotes from dealers facing buying pressure.  According to market 
microstructure literature, common demand of a pair of sovereign CDS may be the result of 
managing inventory risk on single securities traded by a dealer facing that risk (Shachar, 2013; 
and Gehde-Trapp, Gündüz, and Nasev, 2015).24 The buying pressure could also obey to the 
dealers’ willingness to express their opinion or information on the country creditworthiness 
using naked CDS positions (Duffie, 2010). 
Most of the quotes are reported by a small number of dealers (see Section II. A) and 
so, the commonalities in quotes associated to these dealers could have a stronger effect on 
the excess correlations. In fact, Mengle (2010) documents that the 14 largest dealers 
worldwide hold roughly 90% of the CDS notional amount. To deal with this issue we define a 
more disaggregated version of the commonalities in quotes variables for dealers facing buying 
pressure. To capture the effect of dealers’ market power, we break down the variable 
Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ) in two variables according to the dealer’s 
activity. We define active dealers facing buying pressure in a given month t as those whose 
total number of quotes to a given pair of countries is above the median (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻வ௣௖௧௟ହ଴) of the 
distribution of the total number of quotes per pair and dealer. Given that dealers contributing a 
high number of quotes are expected to trade more, it seems reasonable to refer to the active 
dealers as large dealers. Column (2) of Table VIII contains the results obtained from the joint 
use of the four types of commonalities. We observe that the effect of the Commonality in 
Quotes is dominated by the activity of larger dealers among those facing buying pressure. This 
finding is in agreement with Gehde-Trapp, Gündüz, and Nasev (2015), whose findings are 
                                                                          
22. As illustrated by Yorulmazer (2013), AIG claimed in its public financial statements that 72% of the notional amounts of 
CDS sold by AIG Financial Products as of December 2007 were used by European and other banks for capital relief. 
23. The new regulatory requirements due to Basel III that aim to reduce counterparty credit risk in derivatives transactions 
have also contributed to increase dealers’ demand pressure (see Klingler and Lando, 2014). 
24. Inventory control and risk-sharing has attracted significant attention in the stock market as a motive behind interdealer 
trading (see Garman (1976), Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1983), O’Hara and Oldfield (1986), 
among others). According to this literature, dealers accommodate buying and selling by outside investors and adjust their 
quoted prices to restore their inventories to some desired level, thereby causing price movements. 
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consistent with the “notion that the lack of competition in CDS markets gives rise to dealer 
market power with significant price impact”. 
Finally, we try to shed more light on the role of buying pressure on CDS comovements 
by means of a new definition of the trading pressure variables. For that aim, we classify the 
quotes as trades using information on the number of trades in a single week based on the 
method described in Subsection A.2.3. In sum, we use information from DTCC on the number 
of trades per week, and then assign as trades the best bid and ask quotes in each week. Then, 
we aggregate the number of weekly trades for each dealer at the monthly level to classify the 
dealers depending on their trading pressure in each month. Thus, a dealer faces buying (selling) 
pressure when his/her net trading position in a given month is positive (negative), which 
indicates that he/she is in fact buying (selling) CDS in that month. Those dealers whose net 
trading position in that month is equal to zero do not suffer either buying or selling pressure. 
Finally, we break down the variable Commonality in Quotes in three variables using separately 
quotes from those dealers facing (i) buying pressure, (ii) selling pressure, or (iii) neither buying 
nor selling pressure. The results obtained from the new measures of trading pressure are 
reported in column (4) of Table VIII and support the significant role played by the dealers facing 
buying pressure on CDS excess correlations.  
3.3 Accounting for Endogeneity 
In our analysis, we have regressed monthly CDS excess comovements on dealers’ quote 
commonalities. Nevertheless, endogeneity may be a concern here because it is plausible that 
innovations in CDS excess comovements may simultaneously affect the dealers’ common 
quotes through some behavior observed in such correlations. To conclude that the 
Commonality in Quotes is indeed causing an increase in CDS excess comovements, we re-
estimate the regressions reported in equation (4) using two different methods: an instrumental 
variable approach, and an analysis using the commonalities in quotes filtered from the three 
lags of CDS return correlations. In addition to dealing with endogeneity, the instrumental 
variable approach also strengthens our hypothesis of this effect coming from a non-
fundamental friction. Indeed, if it was a different channel (different from the use of CDS as 
capital relief purposes), then we would not necessarily see a correlation of our instrument with 
our Commonality in Quotes variable, as we will see in the next few paragraphs. 
We first consider the use of instrumental variables. We require an instrumental variable 
that exclusively affects the participants in the CDS market, not the entire economy. The channel 
through which we explain the effect of Commonality in Quotes on CDS excess correlation is the 
demand pressure of sovereign CDS to mitigate credit risk exposures for capital relief 
purposes. In the context of the Basel II Accord, banks should satisfy a minimum capital 
requirement defined as the ratio between core equity (or Tier 1 capital) and risk weighted 
assets (RWA). In the RWA calculation under the Standardised Approach, claims on sovereign 
debt are risk weighted depending on the rating of the issuer country: 0% (AAA to AA-), 20% 
(A+ to A-), 50% (BBB+ to BBB-), 100% (BB+ to B- or unrated), 150% (below B-).25,26 In view 
of this, we use as an instrument for each pair of countries the average quarterly Tier 1 capital 
ratio of a subset of internationally active banking institutions. 
                                                                          
25. http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1312v.htm 
26. IRB risk weights for sovereign assets are even higher. For instance, the illustrative example provided in the previous 
link to the treatment of sovereign risk in the Basel capital framework assigns a weight of 7.53% to a sovereign asset with a 
probability of default of 0.01%, a loss given default of 45%, and a maturity of 2.5 year. 
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The banks employed to obtain the average quarterly Tier 1 for a given pair of countries 
are those for which the sovereign debt of these countries has positive risk weights. These 
banks are selected as follows. First, we require that banks’ headquarters are not located in any 
of the two countries/economic areas forming the pair.27 Second, we require that the domestic 
banks of a given country exhibit a positive exposure to the official sector of both countries 
forming the pair.28 There is not available information on the direct exposure of each individual 
bank to the sovereign debt of a given country. Instead, we use the consolidated bank statistics 
provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) that contain information on the 
aggregate exposure of domestic banks in each country to the official sector of the counterparty 
countries in the pair. Third, we exclude banks with subsidiaries in any of the two countries 
forming the pair. This requirement is imposed to avoid imputing positive weights to those banks 
that purchase debt through their subsidiaries located in a given country. 
Our instrumental variable proxies a demand shock on the sovereign CDS to hedge the 
credit exposures of the largest and global active banks where improvements of the average Tier 1 
capital ratio are related to an efficient use of sovereign CDS. The motivation for the use of this 
instrumental variable relies on Yorulmazer (2013), Hasan and Wu (2016), Shan, Tang, and Yan 
(2016), and Augustin, Sokolovski, Subrahmanyam, and Tomio (2017) evidence about the use of 
CDS by banks to reduce the capital requirements for existing exposures (see also ECB, 2009).29 
Concretely, Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016) document that banks’ risk-weighted assets shrink after 
using CDS given that its use enables banks to shift assets from higher risk-weight categories to 
the 0%-risk category. Thus, they are able to hold less capital while complying with the 
requirements of regulatory capital ratios. Hasan and Wu (2016) test five hypotheses on whether 
banks use CDS to hedge corporate loans, provide credit enhancements, obtain regulatory capital 
relief, and exploit banking relationship and private information. They find strong evidence for the 
credit enhancement and regulatory capital relief hypotheses. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2014) also uncover the true effect of CDS trading on rating downgrades and bankruptcies by 
means of an instrument based on lenders’ Tier 1 capital ratio. In fact, they find that the instrument 
is a significant predictor of CDS trading even after controlling for all other variables. 
Given that information on the Tier 1 capital ratio is released on a quarterly basis, we 
define the dependent and independent variables on a quarterly basis.  These data are obtained 
from COMPUSTAT and from the individual banks quarterly and annual reports when 
information is not available in COMPUSTAT. We use a sample of 48 large banking institutions 
from 14 countries to define the instrument. These international banks are among the ones used 
by López-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2012) in their analysis of systemic risk.30  
                                                                          
27. Basel II Accord recognizes the national discretion of lowering the risk weight applied to their banks’ exposures 
denominated in domestic currency and, in fact, it is often in practice zero. For this reason, in the case of EMU countries, 
we do not consider banks belonging to any of the EMU countries. 
28. The “official sector” comprises the general government sector, central bank sector and international organizations 
(including multilateral development banks). 
29. The use of CDS by banks to improve the appearance of their capital ratios could also have adverse effects. For 
instance, it could lead to an incentive to invest in highly risky projects (Yorulmazer, 2013), and, as a consequence, to 
increase systemic risk. 
30. The list of banks and countries is as follows: Australia (Westpac, Commonwealth Bank, and National Australian Bank), 
Austria (Erste Group), Belgium (KBC Group), Canada (Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank, Bank of Montreal, 
Bank of Nova Scotia, and Toronto Dominion), France (BNP Paribas and Societé Generale), Germany (Commerzbank and 
Deutsche Bank), Great Britain (Barclays, Lloyds, RBS, HSBC, and Standard Chartered), Ireland (Allied Irish Banks), Italy 
(Unicredit, Intensa Sanpaolo, and Monte dei Paschi di Siena), Japan (Nomura and Daiwa Securities Bank), Spain (BBVA, 
Banco Popular, Banco Santander), Sweden (Svenska Handelsbanken, SEB, Nodea Bank, and Swedbank), Switzerland 
(Credit Suisse and UBS), and United States of America (Regions Financial, Goldman Sachs, State Street, BB&T, PNC 
Financial Svcs Group, Bank of New York Mellon, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp, Suntrust, Citigroup, Bank of America, JP 
Morgan, Wells Fargo, and Capital One). 
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The instrumental variable regression is based on equation (4) in which the 
Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ) is instrumented through the 
abovementioned instrument. The regression is performed on a subset of pairs of countries from 
the whole universe of sovereign CDS described in Section II.A and summarized in Panel B of 
Table I. The analysis is conducted on those non-OECD countries with a rating category equal 
or lower than A+ at any quarter over the sample period. These are pairs of countries whose 
long-term bonds have a positive risk weight that could favor the demand of sovereign CDS to 
reduce the capital requirements. The sample consists of 15 countries.31  Due to the use of non-
EMU countries, the analysis relies on quarterly observations for the period 2010-2011. 
Column (1) of Table IX reports the results for the instrumental variable analysis 
conducted on those pairs of countries. The results of the first stage in which we regress ܥܳ௜௝௧஻  
on the instrument are reported at the end of Table IX in column (1). The coefficient for the 
instrument is positive and significant at any standard level of significance. It suggests that 
improvements in the average Tier 1 capital ratio are related to an active control of the RWA 
through the demand of sovereign CDS for those countries whose bonds have positive risk 
weights. Column (1) of Table IX also reports the results of the second stage regression in which 
we use the fitted Commonality in Quotes from the first stage to explain the variation of CDS 
excess comovements. As can be inferred from the positive and significant coefficient for the 
instrumented variable (INST. ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ), we conclude that the potential endogeneity of these 
commonalities does not bias our results.32 This piece of evidence confirms that our finding 
does indeed come from a causal relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS 
excess return comovement.  
To verify the validity of our instrument, we perform the Kleibergen-Paap Rank LM 
statistic to check whether the equation is identified, that is, whether the excluded instrument 
(the average Tier 1 capital ratio for the corresponding subset of banks) is “relevant” (correlated 
with the endogenous regressor). According to this under-identification test, we reject the null 
hypothesis (equation is under-identified); thus, the instrument is relevant and the model is 
identified.33 As the previous instrumental regression is exactly identified, we consider the 
squared of the average Tier 1 capital ratio as an additional instrument to formally test the 
exogeneity of the instrument through the Hansen J statistic. Under the null hypothesis, all 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residual terms and thus, exclusion restriction is satisfied. 
According to the results available in column (2) of Table IX, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. As a consequence, we do not find evidence in favor of the violation of the exclusion 
restriction, and thus confirm the validity of the instrument.  
It is not likely that the comovement in a given pair of CDS may affect significantly the 
average capital ratio of the sample of international banks used to define the instrument. These 
international banks are selected such that they do not have headquarters and subsidiaries in any 
of the two countries in the pair. In fact, the test for the exclusion seems to confirm that statement. 
However, to further confirm that our results are not affected by endogeneity, we perform a new 
instrumental approach in which use the average Tier 1 calculated for each pair of countries 
                                                                          
31. The countries forming the sample are the following: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Ukraine. 
32. We perform a regression analysis to estimate the coefficients of equation (4) at monthly and quarterly frequencies 
based on the sample used to perform this IV analysis and find that the variable Commonalities in Quotes exhibits a positive 
and significant coefficient for both specifications. 
33. We also perform a weak identification test to analyze whether the instrument is weakly correlated with the common 
quotes. In view of the Kleibergen-Paap Wald Rank F statistic, we reject the hypotheses that the equation is weakly 
identified. 
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lagged one quarter. It is not reasonable that the comovements of CDS in a given quarter affect 
the aggregate bank capital ratio in the previous quarter because the dealers’ quoting/trading 
activity takes place after the reporting of the capital ratio. The results obtained for the lagged 
instrument are reported in column (3) of Table IX and support the existence of a causal effect. 
We perform an additional robustness check to rule out how banks’ CDS quoting 
activity is correlated with CDS spreads. Thus, to show that the potential correlation between 
two CDS contracts and banks’ balance sheet is not an issue, we filter even more our sample 
such that we restrict our IV analysis to a sample of countries with an average Fisher’s 
transformed correlation that is between -0.35 and 0.35 such that it is not statistically different 
from zero. As shown in column (4) of Table IX, the instrumented variable exhibit a positive and 
significant coefficient consistent with the ones obtained in the two previous analysis of 
endogeneity, and supports the validity of our results. 
Finally, we perform an additional analysis to ensure that our results do not suffer from 
endogeneity. According to Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008), the cross-security price 
pressure that may lead to excess comovements across securities is higher among securities 
with more correlated fundamentals, for example, cash flows in the case of stocks. In addition to 
the instrumental variable analysis above, we now present an analysis that consists of two 
stages. In the first stage, we regress the Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ) 
on three lags of the CDS return correlation and use the residuals as our variable of interest. 
Filtering the commonalities in this way ensures that the past effects of CDS correlations will not 
be an issue in our analysis. We implement it on the EMU countries employed in the baseline 
analysis, and the results are reported in column (5) of Table IX. These results strongly support 
the consistency of the results obtained in previous analyses. Although we have tried to defend 
the causal relation through several specifications and econometric strategies, it is important to 
acknowledge that they could present some shortcomings and limitations, given that there 
could be other alternative mechanisms in play behind the results that we cannot rule out. 
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4 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effect of the CDS market dealers’ activity on the comovement of 
sovereign CDS spreads. The lack of information on intraday quotes at the dealer level leaves a 
gap in the literature documenting the role of dealers’ activity in CDS contacts. The use of a 
dataset that consists of the intraday quotes contributed by each specific dealer enables us to 
fill this gap and provide new evidence about the role of non-fundamental factors in explaining 
such comovements in periods in which market frictions emerge in the CDS market. 
We show that a simple measure of the connectedness of two sovereign CDS through 
their common dealers’ quoting activity is a powerful driver of the variation in CDS excess return 
correlations. In fact, the economic impact of the commonality variable is much stronger than 
the impact attributable to other country-pair fundamentals such as credit, default, and liquidity 
risks and macro factors. 
The strong effect of this Commonality in Quotes is explained by the strategy adopted 
by dealers to trade. If dealers face buying pressure in two countries at the same time, the joint 
purchases of CDS for those countries would lead to simultaneous changes in the prices of the 
two CDS. An instrumental variable analysis confirms that our findings indeed reflect a causal 
relationship between Commonality in Quotes and CDS excess comovement. 
These results are consistent with the CDS premia containing a non-default-related 
component that strongly contributes to causing comovement across credit spreads. Thus, the 
economic magnitude of this non-fundamental based trading should be accounted for before 
extrapolating measures of contagion or comovement from CDS prices. This would improve the 
usefulness of CDS to monitor credit risk and contagion across countries. In addition, securities 
markets regulators should be aware of this finding, and make decisions accordingly to lessen 
the effect of non-fundamental price pressures on financial instruments traded in markets with 
few and large dealers. 
Finally, the new evidence on the determinants of comovement among sovereign CDS 
spreads has important implications for the risk diversification of the euro zone debt portfolios; 
given that investors should understand that an important part of the comovement in their 
portfolios is not due to fundamentals but to commonalities in dealers’ quotes. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1: Comovements in Sovereign CDS  
This figure depicts two measures of the comovement in sovereign CDS. Panel A illustrates the monthly 
correlation of the daily CDS log return (ߩ௜௝௧) for the considered 11 EMU countries (i.e., 55 different country-
pairs). Panel B illustrates the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns (ߩ௜௝௧∗ ) and 
constitutes our baseline measure of the comovements in sovereign CDS. The charts show the median 
correlation (dashed line), together with their 5th and 95th percentiles (shaded area) for the period January 
2008 to October 2011. Daily CDS data comes from Markit.  
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Figure 2: Commonalities in Quotes 
This figure depicts the Commonalities in Quotes ሺܥܳ௜௝௧ሻ obtained as	ܥܳ௜௝௧ ൌ 		∑ ωௗ௧corr	ሺܰܳ௜ௗ௧, ܰܳ௝ௗ௧ሻ஽೟ௗୀଵ , 
where NQidt and NQjdt are the number of daily quotes given to country i and country j, respectively, by dealer d 
in a given month t, and Dt is the total number of dealers reporting quotes to both countries i and j in month t. 
The ܥܳ௜௝௧ is a weighted average of the monthly correlation between the number of daily quotes reported by 
dealer d to countries i and j in which the weight assigned to dealer d in month t (ωௗ௧ሻ is defined as the number 
of common quotes given by a dealer to countries i and j relative to the total number of number of common 
quotes to those countries. In the case that dealer d does not report quotes to country i on a certain date, we 
impute a value of zero for that date. The chart shows the median correlation (dashed line), together with their 
5th and 95th percentiles (shaded area) for the period January 2008 to October 2011. 
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
Table I contains the summary statistics of the final sample of CDS quotes and the dealers’ activity. Panel A 
reports the total number of quotes and the total number of dealers reporting quotes as well as their daily 
averages for 11 EMU countries from January 2008 to October 2011 at the country level. Panel B aggregates 
countries in two areas (EMU and Non-EMU) and reports the number of countries in each area, the total 
number of quotes and the total number of dealers reporting quotes, as well as their daily averages per area for 
the sub-period January 2010 to October 2011. Panel C summarizes the total number of quotes per dealer 
and the dealer’s market share for the 11 EMU countries from January 2008 to October 2011. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics. Sample: January 2008 - October 2011 
EMU Countries 
  Number of Quotes Number of Dealers 
  Aggregate Daily Average Aggregate Daily Average 
Austria   448773 591 90 28 
Belgium   449147 580 90 28 
Finland   331887 464 90 27 
France   469751 625 91 28 
Germany   386181 521 89 27 
Greece   598638 772 93 29 
Ireland   606506 782 92 28 
Italy   581538 731 91 28 
Netherlands   347764 473 89 27 
Portugal   624875 802 92 28 
Spain   682032 862 93 28 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics. Sample: January 2010 - October 2011 
Areas Number of 
Countries 
Number of Quotes Number of Dealers 
Aggregate Daily Average Aggregate Daily Average 
Non-EMU 39 4656079 8931 48 26 
EMU 11 4803901 9216 53 29 
  
 
 
Panel C: Number of quotes distribution for EMU countries    
  Dealer Number of Quotes   
  Top 10 Total Share   
  1 303851 5.50%   
  2 298052 5.40%   
  3 274772 5.00%   
  4 268195 4.90%   
  5 264496 4.80%   
  6 262095 4.70%   
  7 240076 4.30%   
  8 221383 4.00%   
  9 204477 3.70%   
  10 200736 3.60%   
  1-10 2538133 45.90%   
  11-20 1609411 29.10%   
  21-30 873379 15.80%   
  31-40 335378 6.10%   
  41-50 110119 2.00%   
  51-95 60672 1.10%   
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Table II: Summary Statistics (cont’d) 
This table reports summary statistics on the daily CDS spread level (CDS), the daily CDS spread log return 
(CDS Log Ret.), the monthly correlation of the daily CDS log return (ߩ௜௝௧), the monthly correlation of daily 
sovereign filtered CDS returns (ߩ௜௝௧∗ )) for all pairs of the EMU countries, and the  monthly Commonality in 
Quotes (ܥܳ௜௝௧) for such countries. Panel A reports the information for the 11 EMU countries listed in Table I, 
while Panel B excludes Greece. Panels C and D break down the mean and standard deviation per year. 
Panel C refers to the 11 EMU countries, and Panel D excludes Greece. 
Panel A: ALL EMU COUNTRIES  
Variable Freq Mean SD Min Median Max  
CDS Daily 180 444 5 70 6986  
CDS Log Ret. Daily 0.00 0.05 -0.49 0.00 0.49  
ߩ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.65 0.26 -0.58 0.72 0.98  
ߩ௜௝௧∗  Monthly 0.30 0.27 -0.70 0.32 0.93  
ܥܳ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.75 0.17 -0.15 0.79 0.98  
Panel B: ALL COUNTRIES but GREECE  
Variable Freq Mean SD Min Median Max  
CDS Daily 122 171 5 65 1304  
CDS Log Ret. Daily 0.00 0.05 -0.49 0.00 0.49  
ߩ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.66 0.26 -0.58 0.73 0.98  
ߩ௜௝௧∗  Monthly 0.32 0.27 -0.65 0.33 0.91  
ܥܳ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.76 0.16 0.10 0.80 0.98  
Panel C: SUBPERIODS 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 
Variable Freq Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
CDS Daily 38 40 90 64 184 209 456 862 
CDS Log Ret. Daily 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
ߩ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.41 0.34 0.76 0.12 0.71 0.17 0.70 0.18 
ߩ௜௝௧∗  Monthly 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.28 
ܥܳ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.59 0.17 0.82 0.08 0.81 0.11 0.77 0.19 
Panel D: SUBPERIODS (ALL b Gr) 
    2008 2009 2010 2011 
Variable Freq Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
CDS Daily 34 35 82 59 133 119 264 286 
CDS Log Ret. Daily 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
ߩ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.41 0.35 0.76 0.12 0.73 0.15 0.73 0.15 
ߩ௜௝௧∗  Monthly 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.27 
ܥܳ௜௝௧ Monthly 0.58 0.17 0.82 0.07 0.81 0.10 0.82 0.11 
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Table III: Commonality in Quotes and CDS Return Correlation 
This table reports the estimates of panel regressions of the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS 
returns (ߩ௜௝௧∗ ), with the Fisher transformation applied, for the sample of 11 EMU countries listed in Table I, Panel 
A. The regressions are at the country-pair level (55 different country-pairs) for the period of January 2008 to 
October 2011 (46 months). The independent variables include the Commonality in Quotes (ܥܳ௜௝௧), which refers 
to the number of quotes given by dealers to both countries in the pair, and a set of controls, all of them in t. The 
Fisher transformation is also applied to ܥܳ௜௝௧ and to the rest of controls that are correlation coefficients. 
Commonality in Quotes are obtained as ܥܳ௜௝௧ ൌ 		∑ ωௗ௧corr	ሺܰܳ௜ௗ௧, ܰܳ௝ௗ௧ሻ஽೟ௗୀଵ , where NQidt and NQjdt are the 
number of daily quotes given to country i and country j, respectively, by dealer d in a given month t, and Dt is 
the total number of dealers reporting quotes to both countries i and j in month t. The ܥܳ௜௝௧ is a weighted 
average of the monthly correlation between the number of daily quotes reported by dealer d to countries i and j 
in which the weight assigned to dealer d in month t (ωௗ௧ሻ is defined as the number of common quotes given by 
a dealer to countries i and j relative to the total number of number of common quotes to those countries. The 
control variables include country-pair specific variables and global factors. The set of country-pair variables and 
global factors are self-explanatory in the way they are labeled in the table and in the body of the text. Column 
(1)-(2) report the results for equation (4) without and with the Commonality in Quotes (ܥܳ௜௝௧) variable, 
respectively. Standard errors in brackets are double-clustered at the country-pair and month level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The economic impact of the 
variables in the baseline results obtained in column (2) is reported in column (3). It is obtained from the product 
of the estimated coefficient and one standard deviation of the independent variable. 
 
    
Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily 
CDS Log Ret. 
VARIABLES   (1) (2) (3) 
ZCQ t   0.139*** 0.052 
      [0.048]   
Pair/Country 
Specific 
Variables 
ZCorr. Country Banks CDS Log Ret. t 0.033 0.032 0.014 
  [0.031] [0.031]   
ZCorr. CDS Relative Bid-Ask t 0.131*** 0.108*** 0.050 
  [0.029] [0.030]   
Abs|Deficit to GDPi - Deficit to GDPj| t -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.030 
  [0.002] [0.001]   
Abs|Debt to GDPi - Debt to GDPj| t -0.001* -0.001* -0.020 
  [0.001] [0.001]   
Global 
Variables Δ Log Euribor-OIS t 0.203* 0.192* 0.046 
    [0.104] [0.106]   
  Δ Log EA Treasury Yield t -0.478 -0.478 -0.022 
    [0.360] [0.400]   
  Δ Log EA Investment Grade Spread t -0.101 -0.042 -0.006 
    [0.181] [0.186]   
  Δ Log Counterparty t 0.144 0.143 0.030 
    [0.193] [0.202]   
  Δ Log EUROSTOXX50 t 0.301 0.191 0.012 
    [0.537] [0.576]   
Constant   0.318*** 0.170**   
    [0.039] [0.070]   
Observations 2,475 2,475   
R-squared   0.086 0.106   
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Table IV: Commonality in Quotes and CDS Return Correlation (cont’d) 
Table IV shows the estimates of the regressions similar to column (2) in Table III, but when Greece is excluded 
from the sample (column (1)) and two different subperiods are analyzed: January 2008 to November 2009 in 
column (2), and December 2009 to October 2011 in column (3). Everything else remains as in Table III. 
 
    
Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily 
CDS Log Ret. 
VARIABLES   (1) (2) (3) 
ZCQ t 0.179*** 0.198*** 0.155** 
    [0.052] [0.070] [0.065] 
Pair/Country 
Specific 
Variables 
ZCorr. Country Banks CDS Log Ret. t 0.001 -0.001 0.048 
  [0.032] [0.021] [0.044] 
ZCorr. CDS Relative Bid-Ask t 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.110*** 
  [0.036] [0.034] [0.042] 
Abs|Deficit to GDPi - Deficit to GDPj| t -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.004** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Abs|Debt to GDPi - Debt to GDPj| t 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Global 
Variables 
Δ Log Euribor-OIS t 0.154 0.401** 0.033 
  [0.110] [0.182] [0.159] 
Δ Log EA Treasury Yield t -0.482 -0.408 -0.901 
  [0.436] [0.526] [0.672] 
Δ Log EA Investment Grade Spread t -0.022 0.072 -0.342 
  [0.180] [0.175] [0.321] 
Δ Log Counterparty t 0.126 0.203 0.580* 
  [0.185] [0.239] [0.310] 
Δ Log EUROSTOXX50 t -0.03 0.306 1.456** 
  [0.606] [0.735] [0.648] 
Constant   0.123 0.125 0.157 
    [0.076] [0.078] [0.100] 
Observations 2,025 1,155 1,320 
R-squared   0.106 0.139 0.153 
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Table V: Robustness Tests and Extensions. Alternative Frequencies  
and Alternative Sample of Countries 
Table V reports the panel estimates of several variations in the baseline analysis (equation (4)). Column (1) 
reports the panel estimates of a regression analysis in which the variables are defined at weekly frequency. 
For instance, the Commonality in Quotes is obtained as in equation (1), but in this case we compute weekly 
correlations (Fisher transformation applied) from the number of quotes per day. The same procedure is 
applied to the rest of correlation variables, and for the global variables we take the weekly average. For the 
remaining independent variables, the absolute differences in the ratios of debt and deficit to GDP for a 
given pair of countries are those used in Table III and have a quarterly frequency. This analysis is performed 
for the sample of 55 pairs of EMU countries, and for the period January 2008 – October 2011. The results 
in column (2) are obtained from a similar regression at weekly frequency in which all the explanatory 
variables are lagged one week.  Column (3) reports panel estimates of monthly regressions of the 
correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns in month ݐ (Fisher transformation applied) for the sample 
of 50 countries across the world (11 EMU and 39 non-EMU countries). The regressions are at the country-
pair level (820 different pairs) for the period of January 2010 to October 2011. All other controls are as in 
the baseline analysis (Table III), apart from the correlation of country banks’ CDS log returns, which, due to 
the lack of information, is substituted by the absolute difference of bank nonperforming loans to total gross 
loans, defined on an annual basis. Standard errors in brackets are double-clustered at the country-pair and 
day level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily CDS Log 
Ret. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
ZCQ t 0.104** 0.054 0.352*** 
[0.052] [0.043] [0.038] 
Global Factors YES YES YES 
Country/Pair Factors YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES 
Observations 9,897 9,842 15,310 
R-squared 0.006 0.005 0.217 
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Table VI: Robustness Tests and Extensions. Dealing with the Lack of Trading 
This table reports the estimates of panel regressions of the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered 
CDS returns (ߩ௜௝௧∗ ), with the Fisher transformation applied, for alternative samples of countries to deal with 
the lack of trading in some of their CDS contracts. Results in columns (1) and (2) are obtained from the 
sample of EMU countries, and using all the contracts and months for which there is information in DTCC 
(i.e., November 2008 - October 2011). Results in columns (3) – (5) are obtained using the whole universe of 
sovereign CDS for a time period that spans from January 2010 to October 2011, due to the availability of 
data for the non-EMU countries. The results reported in columns (1) and (3) are obtained using all the 
contracts and months for which there is information in DTCC. In columns (2) and (4) we remove from the 
sample the most inactively traded countries. We consider as actively traded contracts those ones traded 
every week in a given month, according to the information in DTCC, and as inactively traded contracts 
those in which there is not trading in at least one week of the month. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we 
propose a new classification to define actively and non-actively traded countries. Specifically, we compute 
for each month the 33th and 66th percentiles from the distribution of the number of contracts traded on 
the sample of countries. We then define a contract as non-actively traded if the number of traded contracts 
in that country in that month is below the 33th percentile, whereas actively traded contracts are those that 
are above the 66th percentile. Column (5) corresponds to the analysis of pairs formed by non-actively 
traded countries, and column (6) corresponds to pairs formed by a country that is actively traded and 
another one that is not. The Fisher transformation is applied to all the variables that are correlation 
coefficients (i.e., the dependent variable, the variable of interest, and several controls). All columns contain 
the economic impact of the Commonality in Quotes for each specification that is obtained from the product 
of the estimated coefficient and one standard deviation of the independent variable. Standard errors in 
brackets are double-clustered at the country-pair and monthly level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily CDS Log Ret. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ZCQ t 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.352*** 0.383*** 0.330*** 0.308*** 
  [0.060] [0.062] [0.038] [0.037] [0.044] [0.034] 
Global Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country/Pair Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Economic Impact 0.058 0.063 0.141 0.153 0.151 0.117 
Observations 1,980 1,713 15,310 12,299 1,380 3,219 
R-squared 0.098 0.107 0.217 0.243 0.256 0.168 
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Table VII: Robustness Tests and Extensions. Dealers Characteristics  
and Trading Behavior 
This table provides additional evidence on the comovements in returns due to common dealers based on 
the sample of 50 countries for the period January 2010-October 2011. We consider that a given pair of 
CDS has a common dealer if the specialist in both countries is the same. We classify market makers as 
specialists depending on their quoting activity. We use information on the number of contracts traded in a 
given week from DTCC, and assign the best bid and ask quotes to potential purchases and sales of CDS. 
We first define the purchases and sales for each dealer by ordering their bid and ask prices in a type of limit 
order book, assuming that the highest (lowest) bid (ask) prices within a given week are the most likely to 
end up in trades. This strategy enables us to “infer” the number of contracts traded by each dealer each 
week, and to add them at monthly level so that we can classify them as specialists in a given country. We 
also order the best bid and ask prices at daily level and assume that the best bid and ask prices in a given 
day are the ones that are more likely to be tradable. To obtain the number of daily trades, we divide the 
number of trades in a given week by the number of banking days in that week. The daily trades of a dealer 
are then aggregated at the monthly level to classify them as specialist, depending on their trading activity in 
each country. We consider three alternative methods to classify dealers as specialists: (i) those whose 
average number of monthly trades, independently on whether they are purchases or sales, is the highest 
across all dealers; (ii) those with the highest number of accumulated trades independently on whether they 
are purchases or sales; (iii) those that have been the most active traders in the highest number of weeks. 
To obtain the role of common dealership on CDS comovements we propose an extended market model in 
which the dependent variable is the CDS return, which is regressed on a market factor and a 
dealer/specialist factor (see equation # for further details). Each column reports the average estimate for 
each of the two factors joint, with the t-statistic associated to each test (to see if the average estimate for 
each factor is statistically different from zero). Columns (1), (2), and (3) contain the results obtained for the 
definitions of specialist (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, for the case in which the trades are assigned on a 
weekly basis. Columns (4), (5), and (6) contain the results obtained for the definitions of specialist (i), (ii), and 
(iii), respectively, for the case in which the trades are assigned on a daily basis. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
    Weekly Daily 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Specialist             
Average Beta 0.637 0.870 0.750 0.615 0.757 0.757 
t-stat 5.823 8.298 6.777 7.827 11.442 8.366 
Market 
  
Average Beta 0.330 0.095 0.219 0.353 0.206 0.209 
  t-stat 3.115 0.957 1.956 4.684 3.462 2.327 
Average Adj. R2 0.468 0.490 0.483 0.481 0.497 0.506 
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Table VIII: Dealer’s trading pressure 
Table VIII reports the estimates of panel regressions on the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered 
CDS returns (ߩ௜௝௧∗ ), with the Fisher transformation applied, for the sample of 11 EMU countries listed in 
Table I, Panel A. The regressions are at the country-pair level (55 different country-pairs) for the period of 
January 2008 to October 2011 (46 months). The dependent variable in this table is the one employed in 
Table III. The novelty here is that the variable Commonality in Quotes is broken down according to the 
trading pressure faced by each dealer in each pair of countries. According to equation (3), we consider the 
commonalities obtained from dealers quoting ask and bid prices above the 66th percentile in the two 
countries (i.e., dealers facing buying pressure, ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ) separately from those obtained from dealers quoting 
ask and bid prices below the 33rd percentile (i.e., dealers facing selling pressure, ܥܳ௜௝௧ௌ ). Finally, 
Commonality not from Buying or Selling Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧ே஻ௌ) is computed with those dealers that are not in 
the B or S category. Column (1) reports the results obtained from the joint use of the three types of 
commonalities (Fisher transformation applied). In addition, to capture the effect of dealers’ market power, 
we further break down the variable ܥܳ௜௝௧஻  into two, according to the dealer’s size. We define active dealers 
facing buying pressure in a given month as those whose total number of quotes to a given pair of countries 
is above the median (CQ୧୨୲୆வ௣௖௧௟ହ଴)of the distribution of the total number of quotes per pair and dealer. 
Column (2) contains the results obtained from the joint use of the four types of commonalities. Finally, in 
column (3), we break down the variable Commonality in Quotes into three variables (Fisher transformation 
applied), with a new definition of trading pressure based on dealers’ net trading positions. To define the 
trading position we use information from DTCC on the number of trades per week and then assign as 
trades the best bid and ask quotes in each week, that are then aggregated for each dealer at monthly level. 
A dealer faces buying (selling) pressure in given month when his/her net trading position in a given month is 
positive (negative), whereas a net trading position equal to zero indicates the absence of both buying and 
selling pressure. In the interest of brevity, and because the results are consistent with those of Table III, we 
only report the coefficients for the new specifications of Commonality in Quotes variables. Standard errors 
in brackets are double-clustered at the country-pair and month level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily CDS Log Ret. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
CQtS 0.071 0.075 0.010 
  [0.050] [0.050] [0.062] 
CQtNoB-NoS -0.068 -0.054 0.034 
  [0.084] [0.085] [0.033] 
CQtB 0.115**   0.118** 
  [0.046]   [0.056] 
CQtB, >pctl50   0.071**   
    [0.036]   
CQtB, <pctl50   0.022   
    [0.034]   
Global Factors YES YES YES 
Country/Pair Factors YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES 
Observations 2,160 2,160 1,707 
R-squared 0.101 0.099 0.081 
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Table IX: Accounting for Endogeneity 
Table IX reports the results of a set of analyses to rule out any potential endogeneity problem. Columns (1) – 
(2) report the results of the instrumental variable analysis. This analysis is based on a variation of equation (4), 
in which we instrument the Commonality in Quotes from Buying Pressure (ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ሻ. For each pair of countries, 
the instrument is defined as the average quarterly Tier 1 capital ratio (ܣݒ	ܶ݅݁ݎ1) of a subset of international 
banks whose headquarters are not located in any of the two countries/economic areas forming the pair. 
Additionally, we require that the domestic banks of a given country exhibit a positive exposure to the official 
sector of both countries forming the pair, and exclude banks with subsidiaries in any of the two countries in 
the pair. The analysis is performed on a subset of pairs of non-OECD countries with rating category equal or 
lower than A+ (positive risk weight) from the whole universe of sovereign CDS described in Panel B of Table I. 
Information of the Tier 1 capital ratio is released on a quarterly basis, so the analysis relies on quarterly 
observations for the period 2010-2011 (and hence the dependent and control variables are the ones in Table 
III, but on a quarterly basis). Column (1) reports the results for the instrumental variable analysis. In column (2) 
we check whether the instrument in column (1) is uncorrelated with the error term. To that aim, we propose an 
equation that is not exactly identified, by including the squared of the instrument as an additional instrumental 
variable. In column (3) we perform a new instrumental approach in which we use the average Tier 1 calculated 
for each of pair countries lagged one quarter. In column (4) we filter even more our sample in such a way that 
we restrict the IV analysis performed in column (2) to a sample of countries with an average CDS excess 
correlation that is not statistically different from zero. Column (5) reports the results obtained from an 
alternative methodology to deal with endogeneity. This column contains the estimates of panel regressions on 
the monthly correlation of daily sovereign filtered CDS returns for the sample of 11 EMU countries listed in 
Table I, Panel A. The novelty here is the use of the Commonality in Quotes that is due to dealers facing buying 
pressure filtered from the past CDS correlations (ܨܫܮܶ. ܥܳ௜௝௧஻ ). The dependent and control variables are the 
ones reported in Table III. In the interest of brevity, and because the results are consistent with those of Table 
III, we only report the coefficients for the new specifications of Commonality in Quotes. The Fisher 
transformation is applied to all the variables that are correlation coefficients (i.e., the dependent variable, the 
variable of interest, and several controls). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  Dep. Variable t: ZCorrelation of filtered daily CDS Log Ret. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INST. ZCQtB 0.758** 0.881*** 0.893*** 0.447*   
  [0.346] [0.262] [0.264] [0.255]   
FILT. ZCQtB         0.200** 
          [0.078] 
Global Factors YES YES YES YES YES 
Country/Pair Factors YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 569 569 467 445 2,098 
Number of pairs 102 102 91 99 54 
R-squared - - - - 0.101 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 6.921 13.868 15.145 5.617 - 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.060 - 
Overidentification test (Hansen J 
statistic) Eq. exactly 
identified 
0.226 0.018 0.609 
- 
Chi-sq(1) P-val 0.635 0.894 0.435 - 
Instrumented: ZCQtB ZCQtB ZCQtB ZCQtB - 
Excluded instruments:  
Avg. Tier1t Avg. Tier1t     
Avg. Tier12t 
Avg. Tier1t-1    
Avg. Tier12t-1 
Avg. Tier1t    
Avg. Tier12t 
- 
First stage IV approach Instrumented 
Variable t:  
ZCQtB         
Instrument: Avg. Tier1 0.0413**         
  [0.016]         
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